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AFTER GARDNER-DENVER, GILMER AND WRIGHT: 
THE SUPREME COURT’S NEXT ARBITRATION DECISION 
SUSAN A. FITZGIBBON* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this year 2000, non-union employees in the United States do not enjoy 
general protection from unjust termination.  Not one state has adopted the 
Model Employment Termination Act, which would require just cause for 
discharge.1  A split in the circuit courts over whether licensed practical nurses 
performing supervisory work removes them from the coverage and protection 
of the National Labor Relations Act suggests that employees are not likely to 
gain broader general rights or protection in the workplace.2 
A variety of statutes do, however, provide union and non-union employees 
certain particular rights and protections.  Some, such as the Fair Labor 
Standards Act3 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act,4 assure general 
workplace standards for wages and safety.  Other statutes prohibit workplace 
discrimination based on, inter alia, race, sex, age, and disability.5  At least to a 
 
* Professor of Law and Director of the William C. Wefel Center for Employment Law, Saint 
Louis University School of Law.  I wish to thank Robin Halsey for her excellent research 
assistance.  I salute Professor Eileen Searls for her extraordinary service and contribution to the 
Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. Model Employment Termination Act (META) (1991).  See Daily Labor Report 1/31/95 
1995 DLR 20 d 12.  Montana is the only state that has enacted legislation requiring an employer 
to have “just cause” for discharge.  Montana Wrongful Discharge Act, Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-
901-905 (1993). 
 2. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); 
Compare Glenmark Assoc., Inc., v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998), with Waverly-Cedar 
Falls Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 933 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 3. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
 4. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994 & Supp. II 
1996).  See also Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 5 U.S.C. § 6382 (1994 & Supp. II 
1996). 
 5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076; Equal Pay Act of 
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
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limited extent, these anti-discrimination statutes protect some employees from 
unjust dismissals where the injustice stems from prohibited discrimination. 
In the 1990s, there was widespread concern for, and much criticism of, 
mandatory arbitration of statutory employment rights, that is, pre-dispute 
agreements which require non-union employees to press their statutory claims 
in arbitration rather than in court, which the Supreme Court approved in 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane.6  The criticisms focused primarily on the 
propriety and enforceability of such pre-dispute arbitration agreements which 
individual employees entered as a condition of employment or of continued 
employment.7  In view of the backlog of charges filed with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the limited funding of the 
EEOC and congested court dockets,8 the value of an individual employee’s 
right to go to court is at least questionable.  A part of the criticism stems from 
the concern that resolution of these claims in arbitration will diminish the 
already limited employee protection from unjust dismissal. 
Union employees, by contrast, generally have a just cause provision as 
well as a grievance arbitration provision in their collective bargaining 
agreement.  Due to the great success of labor arbitration, it has been a model 
for comparison and contrast with non-union employment arbitration.9  In 1974, 
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme Court resolved the issue of 
the interplay between a union employee’s right to bring a statutory 
employment claim to court and the right to pursue that claim in the arbitration 
procedure of a collective bargaining agreement in Solomon-like fashion, 
deciding that the union employee had the right to seek resolution in arbitration 
and in court.10  This conclusion became controversial when the Supreme Court 
subsequently ruled in Gilmer that statutory employment rights could be finally 
resolved in arbitration.  In November 1998, in Wright v. Universal Maritime 
Service Corp.,11 the Supreme Court ruled that a union-negotiated waiver of an 
 
 6. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).  For criticism of mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration see, e.g., NERI’s 
Position on Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS & EMPLOYMENT 
POL’Y J. 263 (1997); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: 
Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 1 (1996); Katherine Van 
Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract 
of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996); Brian K. Van Engen, Note, Post-Gilmer 
Developments in Mandatory Arbitration: The Expansion of Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory 
Claims and the Congressional Effort to Reverse the Trend, 21 J. CORP. L. 391 (1996). 
 7. See, e.g., EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, II EEOC Compl. Man. 
(BNA) at 915.002 (July 10, 1997), cited in EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, 
Daily Lab. Rep., July 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, 1997 DLR 133 d30. 
 8. See infra note 67. 
 9. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also Julius 
G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916 (1979). 
 10. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 11. 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
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individual union employee’s right to take a statutory employment claim to 
court must be clear and unmistakable (that is, a union’s agreement that 
individual employee statutory employment claims will be resolved by the 
arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement must be clear and 
unmistakable).  But the Court specifically refrained from deciding whether 
such a “clear and unmistakable” waiver would be enforceable. 
This essay will present some observations on this unanswered question and 
conclude that where a clear and unmistakable waiver exists, and the arbitration 
provision of the collective bargaining agreement provides for a fair arbitral 
process including arbitral authority to award the full range of statutory 
remedies, individual union grievants should be bound by the arbitral resolution 
of the statutory claim. 
II. FROM GARDNER-DENVER TO WRIGHT 
Private resolution of disputes arising out of a collective bargaining 
agreement through labor arbitration has been a fact since the 1930s and, 
currently, almost all collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitration of 
grievance disputes.12  In the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 
Congress recognized arbitration as a major factor in achieving the national goal 
of labor peace.13  The Supreme Court elaborated on this federal policy favoring 
labor arbitration in 1957 and 1960 in a series of cases which established the 
enforceability of a grievance arbitration clause against a union or an 
employer,14 a presumption of arbitrability of disputes arising under the 
collective bargaining agreement,15 and the enforceability of the arbitration 
award unless it failed to draw its essence from the collective bargaining 
agreement.16 
This promotion of labor arbitration occurred at a time when courts were 
otherwise hostile to commercial (i.e. non-labor) arbitration as an inferior 
method of dispute resolution and a completely unsuitable forum for the 
resolution of a statutory claim.17  Ten years after the passage of the Civil 
 
 12. See generally LAURA J. COOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION; A 
CASEBOOK 5-15 (1994). 
 13. LMRA, ch. 120, § 203(d), 61 Stat. 153 (1978) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) 
(1994)). 
 14. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (citing LMRA, ch. 120, § 
301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947)) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). 
 15. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960) 
(noting that parties should be ordered to arbitrate “unless it may be said with positive assurance 
that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute”). 
 16. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
 17. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (refusal to enforce arbitration of a claim 
arising under Securities Act of 1933). 
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Rights Act of 196418 the Supreme Court faced the issue of the effect of an 
adverse labor arbitration award on a union grievant’s right to sue his employer 
for racial discrimination under Title VII of the Act in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.19  The Supreme Court concluded that Mr. Alexander had two 
completely separate rights: a contractual right under the collective bargaining 
agreement to just cause grounds for termination, plus a statutory right under 
Title VII prohibiting termination based on his race.20  Noting that Congress 
assigned general power to federal courts to secure Title VII rights and gave 
individual claimants an important role in the enforcement process, the Court 
rejected an election of remedies or waiver analysis based on the inference that 
Congress designed Title VII “to supplement, rather than supplant existing laws 
and institutions relating to employment discrimination.”21  Despite the union’s 
ability to waive statutory rights relating to collective activity, the Court stated 
an employee’s individual Title VII rights could not be prospectively waived.22  
Supporting this conclusion was “further concern” for the tension between the 
union’s role of representing the collective interests of all employees in 
deciding whether and how to take a grievance to arbitration and the individual 
grievant’s interests.23  Finally, the following deficiencies of the labor 
arbitration process were noted: the lack of arbitral authority to decide the 
statutory claim; the lack of arbitral experience and expertise to decide statutory 
claims because, inter alia, arbitrators need not be lawyers, and (by contrast to 
judicial procedure) the lack of discovery, rules of evidence and reasons for the 
award.24  Despite these drawbacks, the Court concluded that the arbitration 
award would be admissible and accorded the weight deemed appropriate in the 
union employee’s court case, based on consideration of the following factors: 
collective bargaining provisions that conform to the statute, procedural fair 
process, adequacy of the record as to the statutory claim, “special competence” 
of the arbitrator, full consideration of the statutory claim and whether the claim 
presented a purely factual issue.25  In two subsequent cases in 1981 and 1984, 
the Court followed this analysis allowing union employees to bring statutory 
claims to court despite a labor arbitration award.26 
 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 19. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 20. Id. at 49-50. 
 21. Id. at 48-49. 
 22. Id. at 51-52 & n.15. 
 23. Id. at 58 & n.19. 
 24. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57-59. 
 25. Id. at 60 & n.21. 
 26. McDonald v. West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (claim under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 
42 U.S.C. § 1983); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (claim 
under Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] AFTER GARDNER-DENVER, GILMER AND WRIGHT 837 
The legal landscape then changed dramatically with the Supreme Court’s 
determination, in a new arbitration trilogy, that statutory claims could be 
finally resolved in arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.27  
According to the Court, “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does 
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”28  It was not long before 
the Court applied this analysis in an employment discrimination case to the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)29 claim of an employee 
manager of financial services terminated by his employer, in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.30 The agreement to arbitrate employment 
disputes contained in Mr. Gilmer’s New York Stock Exchange registration 
application was covered by the FAA which contains “a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements.”31  Nothing in the text or legislative history of 
the ADEA precluded arbitration and the Court was not persuaded that 
mandatory arbitration would undermine the statute’s framework or purpose.32  
Gilmer’s general attacks on arbitration as an inferior process (which echoed 
those listed in Gardner-Denver), inter alia, were rejected as vestiges of a prior 
judicial hostility to the arbitral process and “far out of step with [the Court’s] 
current strong endorsement” of arbitration.33  The Court specifically dismissed 
general arguments of arbitral bias or incompetence, insufficient discovery, and 
lack of written opinions and of public knowledge of results, citing the FAA 
safeguards against arbitral bias and procedural deficiencies, and the 
requirements of the NYSE rules.34  Further, unequal bargaining power between 
the parties in the employment context, without more, would not preclude 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.35  And, though limited, judicial review 
was deemed sufficient to ensure arbitral compliance with statutory 
requirements.36 
Finally, the Gardner-Denver analysis did not control Gilmer’s situation 
because in Gardner-Denver the employee had distinct contractual and statutory 
 
 27. FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 28. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 
U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 
U.S. 220 (1987) (civil provisions of Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act and 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 29. 29 U.S.C. § 621. 
 30. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 31. Id. at 25 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983)).  The Court ruled that the agreement did not fall within the FAA § 1 exclusion.  Id. at n.2. 
 32. Id. at 26-28. 
 33. Id. at 30 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481 ). 
 34. Id. at 30-32; FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
 35. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33. 
 36. Id. at 32 n.4 (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232 ). 
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rights, the employee had not agreed to arbitrate the statutory right and the 
arbitrator lacked authority to resolve the statutory right, because a concern 
existed that the collective interests of the bargaining unit would outweigh the 
individual grievant’s interests, and because the FAA and its strong policy 
favoring arbitration did not apply to Gardner-Denver and its progeny.37 
Since the Gilmer decision, courts have upheld the arbitrability of 
employment claims under a number of statutes including Title VII,38 the 
Americans with Disabilities Act,39 and the Family and Medical Leave Act.40 
In 1998 in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service, the Supreme Court 
reviewed a Fourth Circuit decision that a union employee’s Americans with 
Disabilities Act claim was covered by his collective bargaining agreement’s 
arbitration provision, and that the arbitration agreement was enforceable.41  
The case seemed to present the question of whether Gilmer had overruled 
Gardner-Denver, that is, was a union-negotiated prospective waiver of 
individual statutory rights still barred or had the Court’s radical shift in attitude 
towards agreements to arbitrate statutory claims vitiated the Gardner-Denver 
distinction?42  The question remains unanswered. 
The Court concluded that the presumption of arbitrability of claims arising 
under a collective bargaining agreement does not attach to an individual 
employee’s statutory claim, but that ordinary analysis of the collective 
bargaining agreement text may demonstrate that the parties agreed to arbitrate 
these claims.43  Such an agreement to arbitrate would require a clear and 
unmistakable union waiver of the individual employee’s right to take a 
statutory employment claim to court, akin to the standard for union waivers of 
statutory rights under the NLRA.44  The Court found no such waiver in the 
Wright case.  More significantly, the Court expressly did “not reach the 
question whether such a waiver would be enforceable.”45  The next section will 
analyze the circumstances under which the Court should approve and enforce 
such a waiver and require an individual union employee to resolve a statutory 
 
 37. Id. at 33-35. 
 38. See, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3rd Cir. 1998) (collecting cases); 
but see Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that 
Congress intended in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to bar mandatory pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate Title VII claims). 
 39. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 40. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 41. 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
 42. Id. at 77. 
 43. Id. at 78-79. 
 44. Id. at 80.  Because no such clear and unmistakable waiver existed in this case, the 
Supreme Court ruled that Wright was not obliged to submit his ADA claim to arbitration under 
the collective bargaining agreement and could pursue his claim in court. 
 45. Id. at 82. 
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employment claim under the arbitration provision of a collective bargaining 
agreement. 
III.  CONSIDERATIONS AFTER WRIGHT 
Since the Gardner-Denver decision, the judicial attitude toward resolution 
of statutory claims in arbitration has shifted from hostile resistance to strong 
endorsement.46  Still the Supreme Court withheld judgment on the 
enforceability of the arbitration procedure under a collective bargaining 
agreement to resolve the statutory claim of an individual represented 
employee.  Three overlapping considerations guide the analysis of this issue: 
first, what may constitute an effective union-negotiated waiver of an individual 
employee’s right to bring a statutory claim to court; second, does the collective 
bargaining agreement’s arbitration procedure authorize the arbitrator to resolve 
a statutory claim and provide for a fair process, and third, do labor arbitrators 
have the expertise to resolve these claims.  If these concerns are satisfied, it is 
submitted that labor arbitration may provide an “appropriate,”47 accessible 
forum which will benefit individual employees and further statutory goals. 
After Wright, an enforceable “clear and unmistakable waiver” of an 
individual employee’s right to bring a statutory claim to court will have an 
explicit submission to arbitration of all federal and/or state statutory claims 
arising from the employment relationship.48  To ensure that a court will find a 
clear and unmistakable waiver, the arbitration clause could expressly list some 
specific statutes and/or claims covered,49 such as the ADA, ADEA, FMLA, but 
also specify that the list is not exclusive.  Courts will be less likely to find a 
clear and unmistakable waiver in the mere combination of a nondiscrimination 
provision (even one which refers to specific federal statutes) with a broad 
agreement to arbitrate all claims.50 
 
 46. See discussion supra Part II. 
 47. See Wright, 525 U.S. at 82 n.2 (referencing ADA endorsement of arbitration in 
appropriate cases); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) 
(codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 1981); but see Duffield, 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that Congress intended in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to bar mandatory pre-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims). 
 48. See, e.g., Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331-32 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 49. See, e.g., Bratten v. S.S.I. Serv., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 631-32 (6th Cir. 1999) (non 
discrimination clause and arbitration provision failed to expressly reference the ADA). 
 50. See, e.g., Carson, 175 F.3d at 331-32 (clear and unmistakable waiver of right to statutory 
forum may be found in express arbitration clause submitting statutory discrimination claims to 
arbitration, or may be found if arbitration clause is less explicit but e.g. the anti-discrimination 
clause “makes it unmistakably clear that the discrimination statutes at issue are part of the 
agreement.”)  See also Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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The union-negotiated agreement to arbitrate statutory employment claims 
also must provide for the “full panoply of statutory remedies.”51  Any 
limitation of the statutory remedial authority of the arbitrator lends credence to 
the argument that the agreement to arbitrate these claims effectively requires 
the individual employee to forego part of the substantive statutory right and 
consequently constitutes more than a mere choice of forum.  Such limitations 
also undercut assertions that arbitral resolutions will serve statutory policies 
and goals.  Moreover, a collective bargaining agreement arbitration clause 
which expressly covers statutory employment claims and provides for full 
statutory remedies would clearly and unquestionably authorize the arbitrator to 
resolve these claims. 
Adoption in the arbitration clause of the relevant safeguards the “Due 
Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes arising 
out of the Employment Relationship” would assure a fair arbitral procedure for 
the statutory employment claim.52  The Due Process Protocol safeguards 
include the aforementioned arbitral authority to provide remedies equal to 
those provided by the law and further call for adequate access to information 
necessary to process the employee’s claim, for written awards with an opinion 
and reasons, and for limited judicial review of the binding award.53  The 
majority of collective bargaining agreements currently require that a written 
reasoned opinion accompany the award because the employer and the union 
have to understand the arbitrator’s interpretation of the agreement and to react 
to the award, e.g., by reinstating an employee, adjusting pay etc. 
Concerns for a “knowing” agreement to arbitrate statutory employment 
claims54 may be allayed by the previously recommended explicit provision 
committing resolution of statutory claims to arbitration. A clear provision will 
not only support a judicial finding of arbitrability but also will notify 
represented employees that these claims will be resolved in arbitration.  The 
inclusion of such an explicit arbitration clause in the collective bargaining 
agreement also may prompt the employer to bring this provision to the 
attention of union members to avoid claims of surprise.  The union may be 
similarly motivated to alert employees to the coverage of statutory claims 
 
 51. David E. Feller, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Discrimination Claims Under A 
Collective Bargaining Agreement: The Odd Case of Caesar Wright, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. 
J. 53, 82 (1998). 
 52. Christopher A. Barreca, et al., Document, A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and 
Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, DISP. RESOL. J., 
Oct-Dec. 1995, at 37-39 [hereinafter Due Process Protocol]. 
 53. Id. at 38-39. 
 54. While taking no stand on mandatory agreements to arbitrate individual statutory claims, 
the Due Process Protocol states that “such agreements should be knowingly made.”  Id. at 37-38.  
See also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994) (individual employee not 
bound by agreement to arbitrate Title VII discrimination claims unless knowingly made). 
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under the arbitration clause and may also promote awareness of the clause if it 
is seen as a benefit. 
The enforceability of a clear and unmistakable waiver negotiated by the 
union on behalf of individual union members also raises concern for the 
individual’s lack of choice or assent to submit these statutory claims to 
arbitration.  But a union-negotiated clear and unmistakable waiver as defined 
in Wright should be evaluated in light of the conclusion in Gilmer that an 
arbitration agreement which is the product of unequal bargaining power, e.g., 
between employer and employee or securities dealer and investor, is still 
enforceable.55  The union-member’s limited choice or lack of actual assent to 
the arbitration agreement is strikingly similar to the degree of assent necessary 
to enforce individual, non-union employees’ agreements to arbitrate statutory 
claims.56  Adhesion contracts are enforceable so long as the terms of the 
bargain are not so unfair as to produce an unconscionable agreement.57  Thus a 
collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause which provides a 
fair process for the resolution of the individual’s statutory claims should be 
viewed as a fair and enforceable term.  Moreover, Professor Theodore J. St. 
Antoine has noted that, “in terms of bargaining power, one might argue that a 
union’s agreement to arbitrate and waive the judicial forum should be more 
acceptable - less of a ‘contract of adhesion’ - than an isolated individual 
employee’s agreement.”58 
The union and the employer are the parties to the arbitration clause of the 
collective bargaining agreement and under most collective bargaining 
agreements, the union decides whether to pursue the claim of an individual 
grievant to arbitration.  Concern for potential conflict and tension between the 
union’s role as the representative of collective interests and protection of the 
statutory rights of the individual union member are at least substantially 
diminished by the union’s duty of fair representation59 to all represented 
 
 55. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (“Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a 
sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment 
context.”). 
 56. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alternative) 
Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 591, 610-11 (the union employee and the “Gilmer employee” 
face the same options: take the arbitration agreement or find another job).  But see Martin H. 
Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
77, 87 (1996) (asserting that, in theory, the individual, non-union employee may strike a separate 
deal excluding arbitration, while this is not an option for union employees). 
 57. See, e.g., E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 307-16 (3rd ed. 1999). 
 58. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Krinock Lecture Series: Mandatory Arbitration of Employee 
Discrimination Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 3 
(1998). 
 59. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (noting that a union may not “arbitrarily ignore a 
meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion”).   
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employees. Fear of the mere filing of duty of fair representation lawsuits, 
regardless of whether the union may have a strong likelihood of winning that 
lawsuit, motivates unions to take serious cases (such as discharge cases) and 
even cases of questionable merit to arbitration.60  Unions have had much 
experience handling the responsibility of representing a variety of interests.  
One of the most important union functions is to resolve tensions between 
represented employees and to “deal with these conflicts on a principled basis, 
subject to the duty of fair representation.”61  And times have changed since 
Gardner-Denver. In the 1990s AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney 
pronounced recruitment and inclusion of women and minorities as a priority of 
the union movement.62  Obviously this should translate into increased harmony 
of interests between unions and represented employees with discrimination 
claims.63  It is noteworthy that Title VII applies to unions as well as to 
employers and thus provides an additional incentive to avoid a conflict of 
interest in pursuing these claims.64 
It is submitted that while judicial review of labor arbitration awards must 
be limited to provide and preserve the benefit of finality of the process, courts 
still have demonstrated the capacity to provide sufficient judicial review of 
statutory claims resolved in labor arbitration, primarily on grounds of violation 
of public policy.65  Without any change in law, courts will surely provide 
 
 60. For a fuller discussion of this point, see Daniel Roy, Note: Mandatory Arbitration of 
Statutory Claims in the Union Workplace After Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 74 
IND. L.J. 1347, 1364-68 (1999). 
 61. See Feller, supra note 51, at 78. 
 62. See, e.g., AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney’s Keynote Address to the AFL-CIO 
Convention, Sept. 22, 1997, BNA DAILY LABOR REPORT, Sept. 23, 1997 available in LEXIS, 
1997 DLR 184 d23. 
 63. At least one commentator has suggested that individually represented employees could 
be given the option of choosing to “arbitrate all discrimination claims at their own expense.”  Ann 
C. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: The Fourth Circuit’s 
Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL’Y J., 
123, 163 (1998).  This proposal would likely prove unworkable because the employee would 
have difficulty finding an attorney to handle the claim and the expense of the process would put 
the process beyond the means of many employees.  Id. at 164-66.  Assuming that the statutory 
claims are intertwined with the labor contract claims, another significant drawback is that the 
perspective of the union would be lost in terms of helping the grievant and of protecting the 
bargaining unit interests.  See id.; see also Roy, supra note 60, at 1368-71; Richard A. Bales, The 
Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment Rights:  Theoretical Origins 
and a Proposed Reconciliation, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 687, 759 (1997). 
 64. Sections 703(c) & (d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(c) & (d); see Goodman v. Lukens Steel 
Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987) (union must process individual grievances in a non-discriminatory 
fashion and may not “categorize racial grievances as unworthy of pursuit.”). 
 65. See, e.g., United Paperworks Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). See also 
Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 776, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.) cert. denied 506 U.S. 
1022 (1992) (vacating on public policy grounds an award which reinstated a driver discharged for 
apparently assaulting a female customer by grabbing her breast, pushing himself against her and 
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review “sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of 
the statute at issue.”66 
In sum a collective bargaining agreement with an explicit agreement to 
arbitrate statutory claims which specifically authorizes the arbitrator to resolve 
these claims and to award the full range of remedies and provides a fair 
arbitration procedure should be deemed a clear and unmistakable waiver of a 
union-represented employee’s right to bring a statutory employment claim to 
court.  Reasons supporting enforcement of such a waiver will now be 
addressed. 
Under a usual grievance arbitration procedure, the union and employer 
mutually select the arbitrator according to a labor contract procedure or 
through an appointing agency, such as the American Arbitration Association or 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, which supplies a list of 
arbitrators.  The union, more than an individual employee, will have access to 
information on various arbitrators, e.g., from past experience or from other 
unions, and should be able to select a capable, impartial arbitrator.  The union 
and employer also pay for the arbitrator’s fee, hearing room charges, etc. and 
the union supplies a representative for the grievant in arbitration.  Given the 
overwhelming number of charges filed with the EEOC and the agency’s 
limited budget and the backlog of cases on judicial dockets, the majority of 
employment claims will not be resolved by EEOC action or by trial, so the 
opportunity to pursue a statutory employment claim in arbitration provides the 
employee the real benefit of a forum.67  Professor St. Antoine has observed that 
the small potential recovery of the vast majority of discrimination claimants 
limits their ability to find an attorney who can afford to take the case and that 
for these claimants “arbitration is the most feasible recourse.”68  Citing another 
practical benefit of arbitration to employees, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Harry T. Edwards has noted, “Arbitration also 
offers employees a guarantee that there will be a hearing on the merits of their 
claims; no such guarantee exists in litigation where relatively few employees 
 
making offensive remarks); Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union Local 915, 915 
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990) cert. denied 499 U.S. 922 (1991) (vacating on grounds of public policy, 
an award which reinstated a male employee who had been terminated for sexually harassing 
female coworkers).  For a discussion of how courts effectively review labor arbitration awards on 
public policy grounds and despite the limited standard of review to determine whether the award 
“draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement,” see United Steelworkers of Am. v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).  See Susan A. FitzGibbon, The Judicial 
Itch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 485 (1990). 
 66. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 n.4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYEE 
POL’Y J. 221 (1997).  See also Bales, supra note 63, at 743, 749-50, 753 (noting that arbitration 
of statutory claims under a collective bargaining agreement would provide the advantages of 
access to an adjudicatory forum and preservation of the employment relation).  
 68. St. Antoine, supra note 58, at 7-8. 
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survive the procedural hurdles necessary to take a case to trial in the federal 
courts.”69 
Shifting to a broader perspective, it is noteworthy that after reviewing an 
extensive number of court cases and published labor arbitration awards dealing 
with sexual harassment, Professor Vern Hauck concluded that in the collective 
bargaining context, arbitrators consistently ruled against employers who failed 
to proscribe sexual harassment according to the Supreme Court standard and 
that these awards prompted adoption of aggressive anti-sexual harassment 
policies.70  This serves as an example of how resolution of statutory 
employment claims in an arbitration forum designed to have a connection to 
and an impact on the workplace also will further the broader goals of the 
employment statutes because managers and coworkers will be well aware of 
and forced to deal with the results of arbitration.71  Also, the arbitral resolution 
will certainly be faster than litigation.  A decision closer in time to the statutory 
violation is more likely to send a message to and have a conduct-regulating 
effect on the workplace, especially, e.g., if the arbitrator reinstates an employee 
terminated in violation of a statute.72  Moreover, if union employees with 
“small” statutory claims take advantage of the availability of the labor 
arbitration forum, then the relatively quick resolution of numerous small 
statutory employment claims in labor arbitration will also exert a powerful 
conduct-regulating effect on the workplace.  In light of the fact that Congress 
passed anti-discrimination legislation to eradicate employment discrimination 
from the workplace, a forum which affords the opportunity to effectuate that 
goal fairly and efficiently should be accepted.73 
A final point for consideration is whether labor arbitrators have sufficient 
expertise to handle statutory employment claims.  In the Gilmer decision, the 
Supreme Court rejected the “judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration 
and of the competence of arbitral tribunals.”74  Since the Gardner-Denver 
decision, labor arbitrators have developed experience and expertise in the 
course of deciding numerous arbitration matters involving statutory claims. 
Based on review of thousands of labor arbitration decisions and numerous 
court decisions, the authors of what may be viewed as the Bible of labor 
 
 69. Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading With Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory 
Claims in Employment?, Paper presented during the “Alternative Dispute Resolution” Conference 
at The W.J. Usery, Jr. Center for the Workplace, Georgia State University 1, 15 (Nov. 2, 1999). 
 70. See VERN E. HAUCK ED., ARBITRATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES at 1-22 (1995) 
(collecting awards).  Hauck noted that “over 125 published arbitration awards have considered 
sexual harassment since 1945, and few have been vacated.”  Id. at 1-2. 
 71. See generally FitzGibbon, supra note 67, at 251-55. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621; Section 703, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a); ADA, §§ 2, 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 and § 12112. 
 74. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34 n.5 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27). 
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arbitration, “How Arbitration Works,” concluded in the 1997 edition that labor 
arbitrators have demonstrated the ability to handle statutory claims as well as 
(and, sometimes even better than) courts.75  As previously noted, Professor 
Hauck similarly found that labor arbitrators capably applied legal standards in 
resolving numerous sexual harassment issues.76 
Parties who prefer an arbitrator with a law degree to handle statutory 
claims may so provide in the arbitration clause and/or request a list of 
arbitrators with a specific qualification, such as a law degree, from impartial 
agencies such as the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and 
American Arbitration Association (AAA).77  A 1988 report concerning the 
members of the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA), the preeminent 
group of labor arbitrators in the United States, and of a random sampling of 
non-NAA arbitrators in the United States and Canada, found that 58.5% of 
NAA members possessed a law degree and that 55.9% of the non-NAA 
arbitrators had a law degree.78  Especially since the Gilmer decision in 1991, 
there have been numerous educational programs and training opportunities for 
arbitrators to learn more about the resolution of statutory claims.  For example, 
every year since 1991, the Annual Meeting of the National Academy of 
Arbitrators and the published proceedings of the meeting have included at least 
one presentation dealing with statutory employment claims: the 1998 meeting 
explored sexual harassment claims in the context of workplace romances,79 the 
1997 meeting addressed “Melding External Law with the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement” and “What to Expect at Your Employment 
Arbitration”;80 the 1996 meeting presented discussion of reasonable 
accommodation in the workplace;81 the 1995 meeting raised issues of 
 
 75. FRANK ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 538-39 (5th ed. 1997). 
 76. HAUCK, supra note 70, at 1-2 and 1-22. 
 77. COOPER & NOLAN, supra note 12, at 17-18. 
 78. Mario F. Bognanno & Clifford E. Smith, The Demographic and Professional 
Characteristics of Arbitrators in North America, in ARBITRATION 1988: EMERGING ISSUES FOR 
THE 1990S 266, 267-71 (Gladys W. Gruenberg eds. 1989).  This same study found that the 
majority of labor arbitrators were white males over fifty years old.  Id. at 271-76.  Those who are 
concerned about diversity in the pool of labor arbitrators and for the ability of this “average” 
labor arbitrator to handle discrimination claims should also consider the fact that these older 
arbitrators lived through the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s and witnessed the 
conditions in U.S. society which led to passage of anti-discrimination laws. 
 79. http://www.bnasoftware.com/bnabooks/press/naa.htm. 
 80. Rosemary A. Townley, et al., What to Expect at Your Employment Arbitration, in 
ARBITRATION 1997: THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS 235 (Joyce M. Najita ed., 1997). 
 81. Katherine Swinton et al., Reasonable Accommodation in the Workplace: New 
Developments in the United States and Canada, in ARBITRATION 1996: AT THE CROSSROADS 
164 (Joyce M. Najita ed., 1996). 
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“Discipline, External Law and Procedure,”82 and topics covered at the 1991 
through 1994 meetings included “Family Benefits and Homosexual 
Employees’ Cohabitants,” arbitration of sexual harassment and the Gilmer 
decision.83  Other groups including, e.g., the American Arbitration Association 
and the Center for Public Resources (CPR), also offer programs to train and 
educate arbitrators to handle statutory employment claims. Labor arbitrators 
thus have a demonstrated capacity to handle statutory issues and have 
opportunities for continuing education in the resolution of these claims. 
In the 1960s the Supreme Court recognized the special competence of 
labor arbitrators to resolve collective bargaining agreement disputes.  In the 
context of deciding these disputes, labor arbitrators unquestionably contributed 
to the development of a common law of each individual shop which has as its 
centerpiece the development of the concept of just cause for discipline or 
discharge.  Experienced labor arbitrators thus bring to the resolution of 
statutory claims a unique perspective and understanding of the context and 
contours of workplace disputes. 
The great majority of statutory employment claims will present factual 
issues similar to factual issues routinely resolved by labor arbitrators and will 
rarely raise novel or groundbreaking claims.84  Labor arbitrators are 
indisputably well equipped to handle the factual claims and, as noted earlier, 
have demonstrated the capacity to properly resolve even novel issues.85 
Beyond establishing the mere capacity of labor arbitrators to handle 
statutory claims, it is submitted that by virtue of their unique perspective and 
experience labor arbitrators will provide just resolutions of these claims.  As 
Professor David E. Feller has noted, labor arbitrators who decide statutory 
employment claims may provide a special benefit: 
[T]here is the delicate and intricate relationship between the requirements of 
anti-discrimination statutes and the requirements of a collective bargaining 
agreement.  This relationship is particularly acute where there is a conflict 
 
 82. Richard I. Bloch et al., Discipline, Discharge, External Law and Procedure – 
Roundtable Discussion, in ARBITRATION 1995: NEW CHALLENGES AND EXPANDING 
RESPONSIBILITIES 227 (Joyce M. Najita ed., 1995). 
 83. Tim Bornstein, Arbitration of Sexual Harassment, in ARBITRATION 1991: THE 
CHANGING FACE OF ARBITRATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 109 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 
1991); Calvin William Sharpe, Adjusting the Balance Between Public Rights and Private 
Process: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, in ARBITRATION 1992: IMPROVING 
ARBITRAL AND ADVOCACY SKILLS 161 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1992); Steven Briggs, Family 
Benefits and Homosexual Employees’ Cohabitants, in ARBITRATION 1993: ARBITRATION AND 
THE CHANGING WORLD OF WORK 153 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1993); Joan G. Dolan, Special 
Reference to the ADA, in ARBITRATION 1994: CONTROVERSY AND CONTINUITY 42 (Gladys W. 
Gruenburg ed., 1994). 
 84. “Most employment discrimination claims are entirely factual in nature and involve well-
settled legal principles.”  Edwards, supra note 69, at 11. 
 85. See HAUCK, supra note 70, at 1-2 & 1-22; ELKOURI, supra note 75. 
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between the reasonable accommodation requirement of the ADA and the 
seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.  It is also true of the 
requirements of Title VII and the ADEA. Knowledge about the realties of the 
relationships and practices in the workplace - the “common law of the shop” if 
you will - is important for the proper implementation of the statutory 
prohibitions and provision of remedies that will in fact work.  Arbitrators 
chosen by the parties are in a far better position to accomplish that objective 
than are the courts where the union and the employer authorize such action by 
their agreement.86 
Yet another benefit of the resolution of statutory employment claims in 
labor arbitration is the fact that most collective bargaining agreements call for 
a written, reasoned opinion with the award.  These opinions and awards are 
routinely scrutinized by representatives of unions and of employees who keep 
track of how and how well arbitrators decide various claims.  Arbitrators must 
demonstrate fairness and competence to maintain “acceptability” and to be 
selected by the parties.  And, as previously noted, these written opinions and 
awards also substantially contribute to the conduct-regulating effect of 
arbitration in the workplace. 
In conclusion the concerns underlying the Gardner-Denver decision have 
diminished, and where a clear and unmistakable waiver exists, Gardner-
Denver should not be followed. Where the collective bargaining agreement 
authorizes the arbitrator to resolve statutory employment claims and to award 
full statutory remedies and further provides for a full hearing of the statutory 
claims and a fair process, the represented employee should be bound by the 
arbitration agreement.  Such an arbitration process will offer the following real 
benefits: actual access to a forum; a decisionmaker with the ability to handle 
statutory claims and special expertise to resolve workplace disputes; and the 
process will serve the goals of the employment statute by sending a timely 
conduct-regulating message to the workplace. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
If most labor arbitration agreements would provide, as suggested herein, 
for the resolution of represented employees’ statutory employment claims in 
labor arbitration, labor arbitrators could further develop expertise in resolving 
these claims.  There would be more labor awards resolving statutory 
employment claims to assess, scrutinize and criticize.  Represented employees 
with smaller meritorious and even frivolous claims would have the benefit of a 
forum for resolution of their claims and quicker (than judicial) arbitral 
decisions publicized in the workplace would exert a conduct regulating effect 
and serve the goals of the employment statutes. 
 
 86. Feller, supra note 51, at 78-80. 
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The real benefit to employees would be the development of an arbitral 
forum to resolve contractual and statutory employment issues in a workplace 
context.  This evolving arbitration system could then serve as an example of 
how justice may be achieved in the workplace. 
 
